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Confucianism and its Contexts:  
New Research in Confucian Political Learning 
 
Introduction  
Leigh Jenco, LSE 
 
Why should political theorists, such as readers of this journal, engage Confucianism? 
Despite its ancient vintage, this philosophy (or perhaps more precisely, “body of thought”) 
has not long been on the radar screens of Anglophone political theorists, except perhaps in 
relation to some unsavory positions in international politics. The association of 
“Confucianism” with historically non-democratic states has given rise to numerous 
apologetics defending its logic in the name of an authoritarian elite (Bell, 2006, 2015; 
Zakaria, 1994)—something the governments of Singapore and the People’s Republic of 
China have used to their advantage. These associations have unfortunately colored the term 
with a tinge of cultural essentialism or reactionary nativism, further reinforced by the claims 
of academic philosophers such as Tongdong Bai that study of a narrow (and historically 
indefensible) set of core Confucian texts can explain “the Chinese mind” (Bai, 2012: 5). 
Attempting to rescue the insights of Confucian learning from its politicized appropriations 
has become a veritable cottage industry within comparative philosophy circles. 
Unfortunately, these debates also focus on the classical sources—and a growing, albeit 
largely self-referential, English-language scholarship—while excluding a large part of the 
historically relevant Confucian canon.i In the process, they threaten to reify the thought of 
ancient China as the origin of distinctive “schools” or “isms” that somehow endure as 
coherent traditions outside of particular social or political contexts (Csikszentmihalyi and 
Nylan, 2003). 
These (mis)appropriations add to the morass of interpretations that attend translation of 
ruxue—a heterogenous bundle of scholarly traditions and commitments, stretching out over 
more than two millennia across eastern Asia, with varying and sometimes downright minimal 
or nonexistent links to the historical figure of Confucius himself—into the English reification 
“Confucianism” (for an overview of this complex history see Jensen, 1997). Its longstanding 
yet sometimes ambivalent association with governance—whether in terms of its ideological 
deployment by dynastic houses, its promulgation by local elites, or the background 
assumptions it offered to active members of the public—only further complicates the picture 
of what it amounts to, and how it might (or even should) be corralled into use as a 
“philosophy” or “political theory” (see, e.g., Chen, 2003; Peng, 2003). As Benjamin Elman 
notes in his magisterial study of evidential learning (kaozheng), the Qing-era historicist turn 
of ruxue that is almost systematically ignored by contemporary political theorist and 
philosophers: “it is hard to think of any idea responsible for more fuzziness in writing about 
China than the notion that Confucianism is one thing” (Elman, 2001: xxi). 
Yet despite these interpretive conflations and conflicts, political theorists cannot, and 
should not, avoid engaging Confucius or the texts and schools associated with him. This is so 
for several reasons. The vast textual output of Confucian learning (a more accurate English 
translation of ruxue) ranges from redactions and reproductions of canonical texts, to the 
hermeneutical traditions represented by influential commentaries of key thinkers, some of 
them transmitted for centuries if not millennia (Makeham, 2003). The sheer volume of this 
material must easily dwarf that available for any major scholarly tradition—including 
European liberalism—and suggests its massive historical importance over time and space for 
very large numbers of people. It is true that there necessarily lies ahead a great deal of work 
in just coming to grips with the implications of such a literate and geographically widespread 
body of work for existing forms of academic knowledge such as political theory. But to 
exclude Confucian ideas from our study of political thinking would be to do ourselves—not 
to mention our very subject of research—a great disservice. Carrying forward Confucian 
teaching or forms of knowledge-production within the discipline is perhaps, at this stage, a 
prohibitively ambitious goal. But we may nevertheless examine how its associated texts, 
arguments, traditions or practices might challenge how we do business. Although its sheer 
heterogeneity prevents a full accounting of how it might productively challenge existing 
academic dogma, we might consider a salient example drawn from another discipline.  
Working in the fields of anthropology and religious studies, Michael Puett has argued 
that there exists a distinctive indigenous ritual theory in early Chinese Confucian texts 
overlooked by philosophers, such as the Book of Rites, which provides both an alternative 
and rejoinder to contemporary theories of religion which claim their humanism as a 
distinctively modern feature. Because these early Chinese ritual theories “were based upon 
working out the implications of the ways that rituals were explicitly operating,” they did not 
work on the register of belief (as do contemporary ritual theories, beholden to Protestant 
political theology; see Asad, 1993). Rather, they worked on the register of what Puett calls 
the “as if.” Ritualistic constructions of “as if” worlds enable us to “alter the relationship 
between the participants” in such ritual (Puett, 2013: 99) by enabling new spaces from which 
to view such relationships, and in which to rehearse the sensibilities appropriate to their 
ideally realized forms. Puett cites as a key example the ritual of mourning for a recently 
deceased ruler in the Book of Rites: 
 
Now, according to the way of sacrificing, the grandson acted as the impersonator of 
the king’s father. He who was made to act as the impersonator was the son of he 
who made the sacrifice. The father faced north and served him. By means of this, 
he made clear the way of a son serving his father. This is the relation of father and 
son (Puett, 2013: 98, citing ‘‘Ji tong,’’ Liji [Book of Rites], 131/26/14).  
 
As Puett explains, in this particular ritual, 
 
The son plays the role of the grandfather, and the father—the living ruler—plays the 
role of the son to his father—who is actually his own son. And it is precisely through 
this reversed role-playing that the relation between father and son—the living son to his 
living father, and the living father to his deceased father—is made clear (Puett, 2013: 
98).  
 Through such reverse-role-play, participants in this ritual could see with greater clarity “the 
disjunction between the world of ritual and the world of the everyday” (Puett, 2013: 99; see 
also Seligman et al., 2008). This self-evident disjunction does not pose a rupture, but rather 
creates a new space from which to consider the relationship between participants. In doing 
so, this ritual theory emphasizes the understudied role of ritual in our daily life, while 
providing an alternative to ritual theories which turn on belief, conscience, and Christian 
forms of divinity. 
This set of essays in this volume is inspired by such potential for theoretical enrichment 
when the resources of such historically influential (but overlooked) texts are drawn into 
analysis, and when their contexts in larger worlds of practice are taken into account. 
Accordingly, we take on Confucius and Confucianism in a new way. Our hope is to avoid 
much of the cultural and intellectual essentialism that bedevils attempts to present Confucian 
learning as compelling and relevant. Because essentialism derives in large part from a lack of 
attention to contextual particularity, it is perhaps not surprising that these essays combat it by 
focusing on the productive relationship between what we might call Confucian learning and 
its contexts. These contexts are not only historical but also institutional, personal, and 
political: they situate Confucius among his contemporaries, within his own past, and amid the 
range of debates his ideas spawned in later centuries.  
Attention to these contexts, we hope collectively to argue, does not necessarily confine 
Confucian claims to their place of origin or time of utterance. To the contrary, only through 
such rich contextualization can these ideas speak across time and place to provoke the kind of 
analogies that make truly global and comparative political thought possible. In fact, two of 
the essays (by Kim and Jenco) examine how their research material itself provides resources 
for asking such methodological questions about the purpose of historical context for 
intellectual inquiry—contributing, that is, to a broader discussion about the nature of 
comparative method shared across philosophy, history, and political theory among other 
disciplines.  
Youngmin Kim’s examination of Confucius’ historical vision thus suitably inaugurates 
this set of essays. Typically Confucius has been seen either as a dry traditionalist, or as a 
propagator of false and misleading claims about the historical past of the Zhou dynasty 
(1046-256 BCE) whose cultural and ritual practices he hoped to emulate. Rather than slot 
Confucius into either side of this binary, Kim notes how Confucius’ claims about the past 
seem to involve a form of meta-knowing: a recognition of the subject of knowing as tractable 
to virtuous cultivation, and thus as capable of forming critical distance between her- or 
himself and the object which s/he knows. In short, the subject of knowing for Confucius must 
be conscious of the epistemological limits of her or his own belief. As Kim puts it, 
“Confucius constructs the subject not as one who is passively shaped by the power of 
supernatural beings but as an active agent whose subjectivity is continuously shaped through 
his or her engagements within multiple and complex spaces that the meta-consciousness 
creates” (Kim, this issue, XX). Given this, Kim argues, we might understand Confucius’ 
frequent references to the Zhou dynasty to be operating as an imagined signifier rather than a 
set of historical claims, but where each of these requires the other to make their content 
imaginable. The Zhou, on this view, becomes “tenseless” for Confucius; “The untensed 
character of this conceptual Zhou,” Kim explains, allows Confucius (or ourselves) “to 
identify with, resurrect, and relive the life of the past in its totality” (Kim, this issue, XX).  
His lucid and innovative analysis takes Confucius’s epistemological arguments seriously, as a 
means of explaining Confucius’ own historical vision for reading the past.  
Michael Nylan’s contribution similarly challenges existing dogma about Confucian 
ideas by attending to a different kind of context: that of Confucius among his interlocutors 
and friends, and of the persona of Confucius as invoked across a variety of Warring States 
texts. Asking whether the so-called Daoist Zhuangzi is really a “closet Confucian” in his 
support for what he takes Confucius to be doing, Nylan demonstrates the “composite” nature 
of what (or who) we might interpret as “Confucius.” Although current scholarship tends to 
see Confucius as the originator of a distinctive “school” of thought called Confucianism, 
Nylan argues that taking textual passages in context will reveal “the marked propensity of the 
early compilers [of these texts] to borrow ideas and switch personae, which renders modern 
sectarian talk about “schools” wildly anachronistic” (Nylan, this issue). More to the point, 
examining how Confucius is portrayed in the text of the Zhuangzi reveals that Zhuangzi’s 
critique of Confucius is not that he is a reactionary, but that his disciples—like those of any 
master—fail to intuit his own hard-won insights about the Way. Zhuangzi and Confucius, 
then, are not proponents of two diametrically opposed schools of “Confucianism” and 
“Daoism” but rather two personae of longstanding and mutually fructifying association. Her 
analysis suggests, then, that those who hope to engage “Confucianism” must in some senses 
discard that reification in favor of recognizing the original context of discussion, mutual 
interaction, and argument across all lines of thought that comprised the intellectual firmament 
of early China.   
The subjects of the next two essays date to very different points in time, but the essays 
share the same goal. Peter Ditmanson’s discussion of imperial family matters at the Ming 
court, and Leigh Jenco’s analysis of an early twentieth century debate about the status of the 
Chinese past, both show how elite forms of Confucianism posed questions for political 
practice, but also offered a distinctive set of resources for solving novel dilemmas of action 
and thought. Ditmanson’s essay “Moral Authority and Rulership in Ming Literati Thought” is 
distinctive for its deep reading of Ming debates that identify the actual ritual and institutional 
context in which Confucian notions of virtue, particularly within the family, played 
themselves out historically. Modern Confucian revivalists have fixated on the virtue of “filial 
piety” (xiao), that is, reverence and respect for one’s parents, as a distinctive and core 
Confucian value (Chan and Tan, 2012). Yet Ditmanson shows that a broader and more 
complex cosmology is at work, linking personal or inner forms of normative order with the 
empirical order of governmental institutions and decisions. During the Ming dynasty, 
considerations about who had the power to interpret Confucian doctrine and bring it to 
realistic fruition determined power relationships within and between families, regulated 
dynastic lines, and even in some cases acted as a form of constitutional constraint on the 
ruling house. Although some political theorists have recently asserted the novelty of reading 
Confucian ideas in a distinctively political (rather than ethical or moral) way (el Amine 
2016), Ditmanson’s contribution here demonstrates that its political features have long been 
taken as given, debated, and institutionalized. 
Jenco’s essay concludes this special issue by examining how Confucianism has been 
reified, criticized, and in some cases revived and defended during modernization movements 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. She brings contemporary philosophical defenses 
of Confucianism into conversation with an early twentieth century discussion among Chinese 
academics about the possibilities of viewing Chinese thought as globally relevant, modern, 
and useful. Consonant with the aims of this special issue, the essay critically examines the 
de-historicizing tendency of contemporary Confucian philosophy by arguing that attention to 
historical context can enable, rather than resist, the recognition of Confucianism as a more 
widely applicable or even “global” philosophy. Her argument is drawn from early twentieth 
century defenses of the Chinese past as relevant and vital, in the face of claims that it lacked 
anything more than historical value compared to the presumed timelessness and superiority 
of European thought and experience. These defenses, advanced by a number of young writers 
associated with the short-lived National Heritage journal based at Beijing University, turned 
on a sharp interrogation of the present as a reliable vantage point from which to make 
judgments about human history or values. According to these writers, past and present in 
tandem determine the future; it is therefore profoundly unwise to assume we always know 
what is yet to come.  
It is perhaps fitting to conclude this set of essays by returning to this warning. In more 
than one sense, our own historical context (however one may construe the “our”) is both 
unusual and unprecedented. Scholarship in global and comparative history reminds us that 
European dominance is not an inevitable telos, but rather an aberration (and a relatively short 
one at that) within the longue durée of a world history dominated by Asia (Clulow, 2013; 
Pomeranz, 2000; Wong, 1997). Part of interrogating the stability and certainty of our own 
present condition—including the ethnocentric intellectual confines of our own scholarly 
disciplines—includes enabling these global trends of the past to have influence in our 
present. This is yet another reason, perhaps the most important reason, that political theorists 
should engage Confucianism. For all we know, it may well be the future. And it should 
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 i In his review of Bai’s book, for example, John Makeham notes the bizarre failure to 
acknowledge that such texts as the Book of Documents (Shujing) and Spring and Autumn 
Annals (Chunqiu)—and not necessarily just the Confucian Analects or its more well-known 
fellow-travelers such as the Dao De Jing—provided “models of rulership, decision-making 
and political legitimacy that were debated and invoked for more than two millennia….  
Until just one century ago, these were among the first texts to which the student of Chinese 




                                                 
